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The VAT is compared to a turnover tax (TT) given monopoly final
goods and intermediate goods firms interacting strategically. Linear
demands and constant costs are assumed. Via examples it is shown that
for both "Cournot" and "Stackelberg" games, a revenue neutral VAT may
not exist to a given turnover tax; and the TT can dominate the VAT
simultaneously in welfare, revenue and output terms. In other examples
it is shown that the VAT dominating the TT by all three indicators is also
possible. It is also shown that outcomes are identical to the "Cournot"
game when the consumer goods firm is the strategic leader. When the
intermediate goods firm is the leader, intermediate price distortion is
lower and welfare higher than in the "Cournot"  game under both taxes;
and the output neutral VAT rate to any feasible TT rate is higher than in
the "Cournot" game.
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 When the government wishes to raise a given amount of
revenue and when its ability to levy taxes on different goods, except
leisure, is not constrained, Diamond and  Mirrlees (1971) show that a
necessary condition for welfare maximising second best taxes on
competitive firms is that there be no taxation of productive inputs.
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) extend this result to non-constant returns to
scale. This is one of the major theoretical arguments favouring the
consumption type Value Added Tax (VAT) over a general sales or
turnover tax (TT). The former rebates tax paid by intermediate input
producers and levies no tax on primary factors, while the latter taxes
intermediate and possibly capital goods. Since apart from tax
administration and information differences (not considered in these
papers), a retail sales tax on consumer goods (RST) is equivalent to a
consumption type VAT, the argument also applies to the RST.
1
However, the result does not survive if the government's choice
of fiscal instruments is constrained.  This is shown, for example, by
Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) when some sectors are not taxable or when
taxing a subset of goods at different tax rates is infeasible.
2 Furthermore,
Stiglitz and  Dasgupta (1971) show that, if some producers are
monopolists, it may be welfare maximising to sacrifice production
                                                  
1 See, for example, Ebrill, et. al.  (2001).
2 Other situations are where there is decreasing returns and limited profits taxation or
where the government faces a budget constraint. For the case of non-taxable sectors, see
also Newbery  (1986).6
efficiency and tax inputs. They also show that in the presence of
monopolies or increasing returns in some sectors, the difference
between price and marginal cost should be subsidised, with the subsidy
being financed by distortionary input taxes if 100 percent taxes on profits
are insufficient for budget balance. They do not examine whether input
taxation is optimal when, given constraints, there is a tax rather than a
subsidy on monopoly producers, as obtains in most real world tax
systems.
Despite negative results concerning taxation of inputs,
conjectured efficiency benefits and possible administrative advantages of
the VAT
3 have led to it being introduced or replacing other taxes on
production and sales, often the TT, in over 120 developed, developing
and transition economies over the past 50 years.
4 A major exception, the
United States, has state-level RSTs. Earlier analytical comparison of the
VAT/RST with the TT and other taxes on production or sales have
affirmed the superiority of the VAT in terms of welfare, tax revenue,
output or productive efficiency.
5 These comparisons of the VAT/RST with
the TT have either assumed a production technology with fixed
intermediate input requirements per unit of output or competitive firms (or
both).
The assumption of fixed proportions technology for final goods
production is inappropriate when comparing a VAT to a TT, given the
incentive for vertical integration with a TT, to avoid double taxation,
recognised in the literature. Vertical integration clearly involves
substitution of primary inputs for purchased intermediate inputs. The
limited relevance of the assumption of competitive firms is also clear.
This paper presents the first negative results concerning the VAT
compared to other sales taxes, to our knowledge. In the paper the VAT
and the TT are compared when there is strategic interaction between
non-competitive consumer goods and input producing firms. The
framework assumes "text-book" linear consumer and intermediate good
                                                  
3 A theoretical examination of the advantages of transactions  cross-matching, which is
claimed to be a possibly important administrative advantage of the VAT is in Das-Gupta
and Gang  (2002).  Limited empirical evidence is in Ebrill, et. al.  (2001).
4 See Ebrill, et. al.  (2001).
5 Das-Gupta and Gang  (1996) compare welfare and output under revenue neutral
VAT/RST and TT under fixed proportions and competitive intermediate good but not final
good industries. Friedlaender (1967), and Bhatia  (1992), examine price distortions.7
demand curves and constant marginal costs. It also assumes
substitutability between intermediate and primary inputs.
It is shown that in a "Cournot" game, where firms take each
others choices of strategic variables as given,
6 a VAT which is revenue
neutral to a single rate TT may not exist. Even if it does, the TT may
dominate a VAT in terms of welfare, tax revenue and consumer goods
output, though the converse is also possible. The same results hold in
the "Stackelberg" game. In fact, if the consumer goods firm is the
strategic leader, results are identical to the "Cournot" case, though this is
a consequence of the assumed linear homogeneity of technology.  When
the intermediate input firm is the strategic leader, input prices are lower
and welfare is higher than in the "Cournot" game.
The general point made in the paper is that with constraints on
feasible second best taxes and the absence of competition, comparative
properties of taxes are parameter dependent. The message is important
only because the widely adopted VAT is shown in some cases to be
inferior to taxes it has largely replaced.
a. The Framework
A profit maximising monopoly, the C-firm, produces consumer
goods (Q) using an intermediate input (M) and also primary factors. The
inverse demand for the consumer good is P = f – gQ, where f and g are
positive constants. The cost function for the consumer good is:
C(Q,r)=(ar - ½br
2)Q ” aQ, where a and b are also positive constants and
r is the cost per unit M. This is a valid cost function provided  r b
2a > ,
being non-decreasing and concave in r.
7  From  Shephard's Lemma,
differentiating C with respect to r, the C-firm's derived demand for the
intermediate input is M = (a –  br)Q. The implied demand for primary
factors is therefore, C – rM ” CP  = ½br
2Q. The price of primary factors is
held fixed in this analysis.
                                                  
6 Strategic variables are taken to be quantity for the consumer goods firm and price for the
intermediate goods firm.
7 If w is the composite price of other inputs, one possible cost function is with
 b = 2b/w, b > 0, which is linear homogenous in factor prices, as required. The implied
elasticity of substitution is variable and is given by  aQ/M.8
A second profit maximising monopoly, the I-firm, produces the
intermediate input using primary factors assumed to be available at a
constant unit cost according to the function CI = cM, c > 0. Without loss,
choosing the composite primary factor as the numeraire, c is set to unity.
Proportional sales taxes at rate t > 0 and s ‡ 0 are levied on the
C-firm and I-firm respectively. So a VAT/RST is where s = 0, t = v. This is
to be compared with a single rate TT levied at rate s = t . Below, the
notation T = 1-t, S = 1-s, and V = 1-v is used for compactness. Value-
added (VA), tax revenue (G), output and welfare (W) are compared in
this paper. Value added is simply the value of consumer goods, VA = PQ
in this framework. Welfare is measured as the sum of consumer surplus
(CS) + producer surplus  + G. For G and W the expressions are
G = tPQ + sMr
W = CS + PQ – CP – CI =  (½gQ
2) + PQ – (½br
2)Q - M
The profits of the two firms are
pC =  (fQ – gQ
2)T – (ar - ½br
2)Q         (1)
and
pI =  (a–br
2)QS – (a-br)Q.          (2)
It is easily verified that, if consumer goods and intermediate
goods prices are constrained to equal marginal costs, as with
competitive firms, then for any valid set of parameters and TT rate, a
VAT rate can be found at which output, value added, tax revenue and
welfare are higher with the VAT than with the TT.
b. The "Cournot" Game
The C-firm is assumed to treats input prices as given and
chooses Q to maximise its profits. The I-firm chooses the input price (r),
taking Q as given.9
From (1) and (2) the first order conditions for profit maximisation
of the two firms are (second order conditions can be seen to hold):
(f – 2gQ)T -  (ar - ½br
2) = 0         (3)
and
[(a – 2br)S  + b]Q = 0          (4)











=                      (5)
From (3) and (4) the usual property of monopoly solutions, that
optimal output is in the elastic region of demand, can be seen to hold.
This immediately points to a technological restriction on the nature of
strategic interaction:  If the intermediate input-output ratios are
technologically given, then no equilibrium is possible when input firms
take final goods output as given.  The second implication is that VA is
increasing in Q.
The first order conditions are the reaction functions of the firms
which must be solved simultaneously for the equilibrium values Q* and
r*. Note that  (4) and therefore r*, is independent of Q. The solutions are
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Equilibrium values of M, P, G, VA and W can be found using (6)





, production will only take
place if the condition 
S b
a 1
>  holds, which imposes a ceiling on the10
feasible rate of the input tax.
8  Given this ceiling, a ceiling on the feasible
rate of the output tax is implied by (7). So the analysis is valid only for
these feasible rates of tax. By setting S = 1, T = V, equilibrium values of
r*, Q* and M* with a VAT can be found. Similarly, setting S = T,
equilibrium values with a TT can be found.
Of interest is the value of V given T, VC, at which output
neutrality obtains. Such a V can easily be shown to exist for all T such
that [a/b] > [1/T]. Substituting VAT and TT tax rates into (6) and solving
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Given the restriction on feasible input taxation, [a/b] > [1/S], (9)
implies v > t. The subscripts V and T are now used to distinguish
equilibrium values of variables under the two taxes. For output neutral
tax rates, the condition for higher revenues from the VAT (if  such a VAT
rate exists) is,
[1-V]PQ  ‡  [1-T][PQ + rTMT ].       (10)
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Note that (11) is independent of the slope of the final goods
demand curve, g. By  rearranging (11) a positive lower bound for f, fMIN,
                                                  
8 Since  r b
2a >  for positive costs but  r b





2a ‡ >  is one case of
vertical integration. Since the VAT and TT are equivalent in this framework in the absence
of intermediate goods, this case is not examined further here.11
can be obtained, suggesting that for a VAT to dominate a TT, demand
must be sufficiently large relative to costs.
9
c. The "Cournot" Examples
Example 1: Non-existence of a revenue-cum-output neutral VAT
to a given turnover tax. The example has (a,b,f,g) = (20,0.4,2000,0.1).
Furthermore, the VAT rate is chosen to be VC , so that output is the same
as that under the TT.  Welfare and revenue are compared at feasible TT
and VAT rates yielding non-negative profits having t = 0.004n, n = 1,2,….
and also at t = 0.0001. These examples are plotted in Figure 1.
10 Non
existence of a revenue neutral VAT is illustrated by the higher revenue
peak of the TT as compared to the VAT. Numerically, no revenue neutral
VAT exists to the left of the Laffer curve peak for TT rates above 44.8
percent (the Laffer curve peak is at tL, 60% < 100tL% < 60.03%). As can
be seen, while revenue is lower under the VAT, welfare is higher.
Example 2: VAT dominated by a TT when output neutral rates
exist. In Figure 2, welfare, tax revenue and output are compared for
(a,b,f,g) = (20, 0.4, fMIN/24, 0.1). VAT rates considered are at v =0.0012%
and v = 1.2vC such that TT rates are in increments of 0.04n, n = 1,2,3,.…
For each of these VAT rates, existence of a revenue neutral TT rates has
been verified. For example, for a VAT rate of 8 percent, the revenue
neutral TT rate has 6.38% < 100tC% < 6.39%.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward: A part of the
tax base under a TT, sales turnover of intermediate goods firms, is
voluntarily given up under the VAT. With competitive intermediate input
firms making zero long run profits, this does not actually result in any
shrinking of the potential tax base since intermediate input firms have to
shift the tax burden forward or suffer losses. Under imperfect competition
or monopoly, surplus accruing to  intermediate firms escapes taxation
under the VAT. The examples show that this voluntary tax base
                                                  
9 Rearrangement of (11) gives 
T)] b(1 [2aT T 8b






- - - - +
= ‡ .
10 In generating data for all graphs in this paper only values for which all costs, revenues,
outputs and profits are positive have been retained. Also, normalisation via linear
transformations is used so that all series can be plotted on the same graph but without
overlap. For G and Q, 100 and 200 respectively are added to normalised values. For WT
and WV, the normalised variables are 100[Wi-min(WT,WV)]/[max(WT,WV)- min(WT,WV)].12
reduction can sometimes more than offset the production efficiency loss
from the  distortionary TT. One would, therefore, expect the VAT to
continue to retain its superiority if final goods firms or consumers
captured a greater proportion of the surplus than in the examples above,
due to demand being high relative to intermediate costs. That this is
indeed the case is shown in the next example.
Examples 3: TT dominated by a VAT: The parameter set for this
example is (a,b,f,g) = (20, 0.4, 150000, 0.1). As can be seen the demand
intercept is large relative to that in earlier examples being over 90 times
as large as the largest value of f in Example 2, and over 25 times as
large as the highest value of fMIN for the current parameter set.  Even so
an exponential index had to be constructed to enable differences
between the VAT and TT to be discernable in Figure 3.
11
d. The "Stackelberg" Game
The implications of one or the other firms being a strategic
leader, given the above framework, are now examined.  First, as a
consequence of the constant cost assumption,  when the consumer
goods firm is the price leader the equilibrium is exactly the same as in
the "Cournot" game, since the I-firm's optimal choice of r is unaffected by
the value of final goods output, Q. This, once again, illustrates the
importance of technology in determining feasible market interactions.
When the I-firm is the strategic leader, it is shown here that (a)
the intermediate goods price is lower than in the "Cournot"  game,
implying higher welfare and final goods output, and that (b) the output
neutral VAT rate to a given TT rate is higher than in the "Cournot" game.
(c) The proportion of revenue going to input firms for a given TT or VAT
rate is higher than in the "Cournot" game. (d) Furthermore, examples are
provided of TT dominating the VAT and the converse as in the "Cournot"
game.
                                                  
11 Instead of YV and YT what is plotted is the transformed variables
XV = 0.4 exp (YV/YT)  and XT = YT which are then normalised as described in the previous
footnote.13
The reaction function of the C-firm is still given by (5) (but not by
(7)). However, for the I-firm (4) must now be replaced by













- =  0.       (12)
The second expression, which uses (5) and  ,
r
m br a = - =
¶
¶a
can be used to verify that the second order condition holds at the
equilibrium value of r. Explicit solution of (12), which is a cubic equation
in r, is discussed in the Appendix.
Comparing (12) with (4) it can be seen, as may be expected, that
the optimal choice of the intermediate input price when the I-firm is the
strategic leader is below that in the "Cournot" game  (but above the
competitive price) given identical parameters.
12 However, profits for the I-
firm must be larger than in the "Cournot" case since the I-firm has the
option of setting the same equilibrium input price but optimally chooses
not to. Furthermore, from (5), the lower intermediate good price implies
that final goods output is higher and its price lower in the "Stackelberg"
case.
To demonstrate the second claim, set the VAT rate to VS, the
rate yielding the same output as a given TT rate. On alternately









      (13)
Since output with no taxation is higher than that with any TT tax
and since output is zero when VS is sufficiently small, an output neutral
VAT clearly exists for any given TT.  The proof that VS < VC is in the
Appendix. This result suggests that less output need be sacrificed
                                                  
12 Rearranging equation (12) gives 1/[eM+eQ] = [rS-1]/rS.  eM and  eQ are the absolute
elasticities of M and Q with respect to r,  and [rS-1]/rS is the percentage mark-up (or Lerner
Index). In comparison, rearranging  (4) yields the standard  textbook condition that the
inverse elasticity of demand, 1/eM, is set equal to the percentage mark-up.14
compared to the "Cournot" case for the VAT to dominate a given TT in
revenue terms.








going to input firms is higher in the Stackelberg game.
13 This suggests
that the TT is more likely to dominate the VAT than in the "Cournot"
game. This tendency is counteracted by consumer goods output being
higher in the "Stackelberg" game, so that tax base expansion and the tax
rate advantage could offset the higher proportion of the tax base
voluntarily given up under the VAT resulting in the VAT dominating the
TT in the "Stackelberg" game. That both outcomes are possible is shown
in examples below.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that revenue dominance of the TT
is likely if the government's revenue needs are sufficiently high, given
output neutrality. VAT revenue dominance under output  neutrality
requires (T-VS)PQ ‡ (1-T)rTMT. Clearly, T – VS > 0 for VAT tax collection
to be at least as great as TT collection implying a higher VAT tax rate
than the TT rate. Since the numerators in (13) are the average costs,
Ci/Qi, i = V, T, they must be increasing in ri, and so rV £ rT . Substituting
for VS from (13) this condition becomes
(aT - aV)TP ‡ (1-T) ) br ( 2
T 2
1
T T - a a .
The bound on T in (14) is obtained from here.
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Since T = 1-t, (14) gives an upper bound on t in terms of the
consumer goods price and average cost with a TT demonstrating the
                                                  
13 This is easily shown by comparing  V , T i ,
) ar 2 ( i 2 fi









and "Stackelberg" cases. Assuming that the ratio is at least as high in the "Cournot" case
and expanding the implied inequality yields a contradiction.15
likely superiority of the TT to the VAT when revenue requirements are
high. Note that equations (13) and (14) do not use any special property
of the "Stackelberg" game and so also apply to the "Cournot" game,
though the bound will not be identical given different equilibrium values
of r.
e. The "Stackelberg" Examples
Example 4: Non-existence of a revenue neutral VAT and TT
dominance of the VAT   The example has (a,b,f,g) = (20,0.4,700,0.1).
Welfare, output and revenue are compared at feasible TT and VAT rates
yielding non-negative profits having t = 0.004n, n = 1,2,… and also at
t = 0.0001. VAT rate plotted are v =1.1t.  These examples are plotted in
Figure 4. Non existence of a revenue neutral VAT is illustrated by the
higher revenue peak of the TT as compared to the VAT. Numerically, no
revenue neutral VAT exists to the left of the Laffer curve peak for TT
rates above 12.12 percent (the  Laffer curve peak is at  tL,
16.429% < 100tL% < 16.43%). The example shows that the TT can
dominate the VAT even for realistic tax rates with price leadership.
Example 5: VAT dominance of the  TT   The example has
(a,b,f,g) = (1.0060, 0.005, 50000, 100000). VAT rates are chosen to be
v = 1.001t. The VAT dominates the TT for feasible TT rates above 2.8%.
Compared to other examples in the paper, even example 3 in which the
VAT dominates the TT in the "Cournot" game, the intermediate input is
relatively unimportant in the production of the consumer good.
Furthermore the demand for the consumer good is relatively elastic, this
being the only example in which g > f. 
14
                                                  
14 Given the unimportance of intermediate goods, welfare, output and revenue only differ by
small fractions at low tax rates. In the graphs, indices of the logarithm of the percentage by
which VAT values exceed TT values are plotted.16
II. Concluding Comments
Given the limited relevance of price taking behaviour and fixed
proportions production technologies in actual economies, particularly
those of developing countries, this analysis, along with earlier negative
results relating to the optimality of input taxation in the presence of
constraints, cast further doubt on whether a VAT really is superior to
other production and sales taxes such as the turnover tax it has often
replaced. Recent empirical evidence on the output or revenue impact of
the VAT in comparison with production or sales taxes it has replaced, in
a major cross-country study of the VAT by Ebrill et. al. (2001), also does
not clearly establish the superiority of the VAT.
15  Despite the special
functional forms assumed, this analysis suggests that a possible partial
explanation for the VAT not being clearly dominant is strategic interaction
between intermediate input and final goods firms. Further empirical and
theoretical comparison of the VAT with alternative taxes is required to
settle the issue.
Regarding further work, first note that, in general, nothing can be
said about the relation between revenue dominance of the VAT in the
two models. Revenue dominance of the VAT in the "Cournot" case can,
for the same parameter set and tax rates, coexist with TT dominating the
VAT in the "Stackelberg" case. For example this can happen at
(a,b,c,d,t,v) = (10,8,2000,1000,0.04,0.04004). The converse is also
possible, for example with (a,b,c,d,t,v) = (20,0.4,700,0.1,0.036,0.0504).
However, if the cost function reflects fixed proportions production
technology, say C' = brQ +  gQ, then it is easily shown that the VAT
always dominates the TT in revenue, output and welfare terms when the
input firm is the strategic leader. So input substitutability is crucial along
with non-competitive firms.  Intuition and examples 3 and 5 above
suggest that, given enough input  substitutibility, say b exceeding a
                                                  
15 They also point to serious difficulties in discerning these effects from
     cross-country data, so the impact of VAT introduction is even more an open issue.17
threshold value, b*, VAT dominance in the "Cournot" case should be
sufficient for VAT dominance in the "Stackelberg" case. A proof of this, if
indeed it is true, has so far been elusive.
The "Cournot" game can be extended to a framework with many
consumer goods firms and intermediate firms with each industry being a
(proper)  Cournot oligopoly. Examples similar to those in this paper
should continue to be possible if the number of firms is below a
threshold. As is well known, the Lerner Index of monopoly power
decreases as the number of firms  in a  Cournot oligopoly increases,
tending to the competitive case in the limit. The voluntary tax sacrifice
argument behind the results of this paper suggests that the results will
not survive the assumption of monopolistic competition given zero profit
long run equilibrium in such industries. It is not obvious how the price
leadership case can be extended to many firms in the intermediate
industry. Extension of the "Cournot" framework to a many sector general
equilibrium model is also possible and intuition suggests that the results
in this paper will survive this extension. Possibly more important,
however, is extension of the framework to the context of open economies
so that VAT zero rating of exports under imperfect competition can be
studied.18
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Figure 3: Turnover Tax Dominated By VAT
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Figure 4: VAT Dominated by Turnover Tax With Input Firm Price 
































Figure 5: VAT Dominating of TT in the Stackelberg Game:
[VAT - TT]/TT
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Appendix
1. Proof that VS < VC
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To proceed further the first order condition in (12) can be used. It is
convenient to express (12) in terms of mCj and mSj using the equilibrium





from (6) and the fact that mij =a – brij, i=C,S, j=T, V.


























(a – 2briS)S + b = 2S(miS – miC) for i =T,V and j = C,S.
Substituting these expressions into (12) and rearranging gives
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iS m  = 0, i = T,V.       (A1)
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First, note that KV  > KT when V = VS.
To see this, expand KV and KT as given in the square bracketed
expression in (A2). This shows that KV   > KT is equivalent to
2 2
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> . But VS < T. Furthermore, rTS >rVS under output neutrality
implies that mVS > mTS.
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Expanding aVSaTC ‡ aVCaTS using Ki and L gives
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Since the left hand side is negative and the right hand side is positive, a
contradiction is obtained, proving the proposition.
2. Solving for equilibrium in the "Stackelberg" game
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This is a cubic equation in Ki which can now be solved for a real root.
The method used in numerical examples is from Knaust (1998). Briefly,
the method requires the substitution of yi = Ki – 0.5 to be made giving rise to
the equation  0 ) 5 . 0 25 . 0 ( ) 75 . 0 (
3 = + - - + i i i i B Y B y . Then yi = Xi – Zi is a
root of this equation where 3XiZi = Bi – 0.75, and  i i i B Z X + = - 25 . 0
3 3 .
These equations in Xi and Zi yield a quadratic in, say, 
3
i Z .
Next, rearranging (A4) gives  0 ) 1 ( ) 5 . 1 (
2 = - + - i i i i K B K K . Given Ki > 1, this
rearrangement shows that 1 < Ki < 1.5. In case of multiple real roots, this
property permits a valid root to be selected.
Once miS is obtained, other endogenous variables are easily recovered.